

## Bio Citizenship a Foucauldian Social Ontological Perspective

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**ABSTRACT :** In this argue I will look at social ontological perspective to bio citizenship. I will look at analytical social ontology and its Foucauldian neo-materialist implications. I will research idea of bio citizenship and emergency as idea that when (and if up to some point) there is need to militarize the basic life as social liberal neoliberals continuation then there is one quite small level of idea where everything is counted and governed as biologically reducible and those feature highlighted as more important part of governing process. Then there is emergency that gives right to put money of state to use of efficient control society mechanisms instead of people having their ordinary understanding in public services and lot of money.

The idea is to sketch idea of bio citizenship and its efficiency in capitalism.

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### I. INTRODUCTION

I will write about citizenship in social ontological framework. Government and its policies shaped by money and mass media make citizenship less governed more constituted by media and text also in poststructuralist sense. Also for other reasons of economic power shifted unstable in many senses. So recordings and text in general known to all social scientists are more important than governance in social ontological sense also. Governance capacity of individual state is weakened by different economist power structures. Quality of public services is vital for the quality of social citizenship. The idea is to quarantee the basic of cultural, physical and societal basics of symbiosis between democracy and capitalism. This happens when planning economy surrounds the cultural, physical and societal basics that are strong to resist the planning economy.

The problem of Causation in Searle's social ontology is the following. Searle does follow Austin in the understanding that speech acts are extrinsic relations between statements text etc. The problem in this however is that there is *nondiscursive presuppositions* (Deleuze & Guattari (2004, 86) are not as clearly understood as clear in the manner of cause and effect. Rather According to Deleuze and Quattari the performative changes the conditions of speech in three different ways 1)It made it impossible to conceive language as a code 2)It has made it impossible to see semantics syntactic or even phonematics as scientific zone of language independent of pragmatics 3) made it impossible to maintain distinction between language and speech. Speech cannot be defined independently of speech acts according to Deleuze (viime kys al) The plane of practise is therefore separate from any other level. So, in this idea, Searle is not separate from the practise approach. The way he makes the separation that he draws his theory closer to the neo-materialist theory by admitting the material nature of the status function in his 1995 social ontology. I will look into the question of causality of the performatives through the ontology of Searle. It is important how the material background enables differences.

At the bottom the problematics could be about Derrida's idea of the possibility of an illocution. It means that the speech act is enforced and does surely succeed. On the other hand a perlocution is more random in effects. The text cannot work causally if no difference is done between the perlocution and the illocution, because only the illocution has the billiard ball touch. To say it in other way it is possible that causal patterns that are connected to social facts or are them an impossible combination? If social facts are understood to be socially constructed? The answer is, since as learned from Bhaskars account of the causality (connected his practice approach to social sciences) potential is the main source of a social sphere. So, in Bhaskars notion nature is not separate from the society in some sense in the same way as for example Latour. Stephen Zepke describes some ideas on how (social) world according to Deleuze (and Guattari) is composed. "This plan(e) of composition is not defined by its form, by its substance or by a subject" (Zepke, 2009, 116) There is example of technology that can be used to counter the argument that economics is about social processes actually (Teivainen 2002 in general) because economics is the process of technical change that counters (as one feature) social threats. This is partly the constitutive argument that Teivainen criticizes in his PhD. When a risk is looked into then social processes must be countered with opposed technology. This resembles also new realist (Ferraris 2013, 2015) divide to social and natural. The idea that in posthuman way nature and society are seen as one whole is opposed to constitutionalism (term used in Teivainen's sense).

Risks in my understanding controlled by countering a tendency until tendencies around the countered tendency are too thick as metaphor meaning functionally that they cause different risks. This last is in critical realist sense, but also a joke. For example, before I did do in Belgium and Netherlands train hopping with no ticket nowadays I buy a ticket but have to hop on a train. Deleuze describes this problem in the following way “representing the topic clearly does mean that it does not only bring to light the situation but also the basic things of the problem” (Deleuze, 2005, 107) This argument is a bit against deleuzianism at least because developer of critical realism is marxist and deleuzianism in general is sometimes against marxism. There is always in marxism the idea of vulgar physical production forces. Then when capital (in very general Bourdieuan sense meaning many capitals) in some sense is collected enough

Representational principle is analytical concept. It allows elements of causal processes to be separated and observed individually. Genetic principle is described: “any ‘object’ is cluster of relations conditioned by composition of determining forces and processes of different kinds. (Due, 2007, 130.) He concludes that “we can therefore not isolate within this cluster an individual thing and ascribe to it a series of events which we then set out to explain” (Due, 2007, 130.) According to Deleuze applies this genetic principle to all features of social organization including the human ‘subject’ (Due, 2007, 130.) The formal starting point of their method is multiplicity. A multiplicity is an indeterminate ‘group’ defined formally as *a capacity to be affected* prior to the elements that it will consist of” (Due, 2007, 130.)

Deleuze describes this problem in the following way “representing the topic clearly does mean that it does not only bring to light the situation but also the basic things of the problem” (Deleuze, 2005, 107) Representational principle is analytical concept. It allows elements of causal processes to be separated and observed individually. Genetic principle is described: “any ‘object’ is cluster of relations conditioned by composition of determining forces and processes of different kinds. (Due, 2007, 130.) He concludes that “we can therefore not isolate within this cluster an individual thing and ascribe to it a series of events which we then set out to explain” (Due, 2007, 130.) According to Deleuze applies this genetic principle to all features of social organization including the human ‘subject’ (Due, 2007, 130.) The formal starting point of their method is multiplicity. A multiplicity is an indeterminate ‘group’ defined formally as *a capacity to be affected* prior to the elements that it will consist of” (Due, 2007, 130.)

On the other hand I will look at the potential of the assemblage theory of Manuel de Landa to give a theoretical space to understand capitalism as double layered organism as Fernand Braudel cited by de Landa says “It was essential to my purpose to distinguish between these two upper layers and explain them in relation to each other” (Braudel, 1992 25) Manuel de Landa writes in his book *Thousand years of nonlinear history* that “we may very well ask ourselves whether some (or most) of these applications has been purely metaphorical. There is, no doubt some elements of metaphor in my use of the terms, but there are, I believe common physical processes behind the formation of mesh works and hierarchies” (de Landa, 1997, 58)

Maurizio Ferraris has related a continental social ontology that is strongly tied to John Searle’s kind of basic book of social ontology. Ferraris details the stages of Poland’s historical borders and states at the end: “It should be clear, then, that the identity of Poland is not founded on its molecules. The identity of Poland is founded on treaties, written records, formal agreements, which all have the interesting feature of having signatures at the bottom of their pages” (Ferraris, 2007, 394).

Ferraris brings to the forefront of his social ontology an element which Searle sees as essential mainly in terms of causal relationships, but which he relegates to the sidelines. At the heart of the theory of Ferraris are registers—in other words, the recordings that, through the background of the interpretation principles of the model, enable the status quo to function. I believe that linking registers of Ferraris theory to the background of the status functions to each other interpreting systems, whose differences and similarities are determined according to the situation. In other words, large principal distinctions are not made, only context-relative distinctions. Here I will combine these ideas of neo-institutional social theory [also economics] with Ferraris’ contemplation for continental understanding of economics as neo-material and institutional in the sense of Ferdinand Braudel, who is important [anti-Marxist] for Manuel De Landa’s understanding of the need for a new leftist neomaterialist economic theory. De Landa calls for such a theory in a 2017 interview with Graham Harman. This is a great possibility for posthumanist thought, since the idea of *x* term as basic for status functions makes technique and material, in general, separate from humans. Material is therefore passive in Searle’s theory. On the other hand, Ferraris shows how material is structured by different sets of rules, recordings, and signatures, etc. Renault (2016) has differentiated between substantial, relational and processual

social ontologies. I will argue that by complementing Ferraris with Renault somehow, it is possible to propose relational and processual or even pragmatist/anarchist social theory as economic theory. This is, anyhow, the continental philosophical argument in many senses. According to Renault, “The first of these two ontological interrogations deals with the types of entities that compose or constitute the social world. The second approach deals with the type of being that is proper to social reality” (Renault, 2016, 23). This idea of Searle’s theory’s causal explanation is similar to the practice approach in Schatzki, and other process and practise oriented (at least partly) Marxist theoreticians. Because both see structures of doing and saying as withholding each other as action and structure. This means that the background makes collective intentionality possible, which creates performatives. I will argue that since according to Schatzki [2002] there is a practice approach that is also about arrangements that are neo-material, it is possible to argue for a part of neo-material theory that is about assemblages or networks of nonhuman actors. I also also raise questions about process ontologies meaning ways to model change in risk society, such as Ulrich Beck’s formulation [1992] about distribution of risks in post-industrial civilization.

In his book *Evolution of Institutional Economics* Geoffrey Hodgson [2004] argues about a general theory of institutional economics in a pragmatist and anarchist framework. This pragmatist framework can also be read in a continental philosophical way and is about processes that question dialectics as the basic term for Marx and Hegel in general, as has been often said in contemporary critical and continental theory. For example, Renault has questioned the dialectics in Marx, Hegel and critical theory in general in an interview with the popular philosophical magazine *Niin & Nqin* in Tampere in summer 2018.

**Ontological Argument :** The ontological argument for social sciences with ontology is important partly because the popular practice approach draws from the same kind of explanation that emphasizes neither action nor structure. I will next go through my arguments that explain the basic elements of practice and collective intentionality as part of the same structure. This means that the whole practice as analyzed by Searle (1995) is composed of three elements instead of one. Dreyfus (1991) has claimed that the contents of collective intentionality form the background, as Searle says. Then, according to Dreyfus’s interpretation of Searle (who is writing about Heidegger’s idea of practices), Searle explains the contents of collective intentionality with its twin concept, namely the background. So the idea of the practice consists of performatives that form the background and therefore create the practice as the institution, like the structure that has the collective intentionality that again allows the performatives. Derrida describes many dimensions of the text, saying that “along with an ordered extension of the concept of text, dissemination inscribes a different law governing effects of sense or reference” (Derrida, 1981). Collective intentionality, along with the background, is the basic building block of the social reality that gives the acceptance that enables different institutions to function.

The collective intentionality of Searle’s theory has been criticized for its simplicity. It has been claimed that it is a problem that Searle does not explain the contents of collective intentionality or, in other words, that his meaning-giving structures are too stable (Meijjers 2003, Spivak 1980). This argument combines the approach of Ferraris that seems to claim that this problem of contents is solved by the text with the idea that the contents should be explained by something in general. Ferraris believes that collective intentionality is better explained through arche-writing, the text as the contents (Ferraris, 2013, 154). Ferraris uses a different term to explain a causal factor or concept. The text, however, is in the scope of the theory, since Ferraris claims that the text is the replacement for collective intentionality. Even though the text is a somewhat similar entity to Searle’s term the *background*, it differs in the sense that the background does not include collective intentionality. The point is that Ferraris seems to claim, as I do, that the background is part of the same structure as collective intentionality, in the sense that the background is the content that is missing in Searle’s term collective intentionality, according to Meijjers.

Therefore it creates the practice in the same way as Searle. The text and the performatives as the contents and the acceptance, or the background, the collective intentionality and the performatives are basically the same parts: the contents and the acceptance and the deeds that can be performed in this framework. The concept of contents, therefore, has many qualities that function in different ways to keep up the social world, as Dave Elder-Vass and Brian Epstein have claimed. There are differences in the terms that explain how the social world and performatives function (or rather, how many and which terms explain its functioning), and this is where the idea of practice comes into the picture. Practice is understood as the background that creates collective intentionality or the text. Can the background create collective intentionality as one of its functions (which is still only a part of the process)? There we need process ontology to make sense to this situation.

Could and should we explicate which terms we use to analyze the particles of the practice and different combinations of their relations? In addition, which are the relations of these terms as particles of practise? The terms compared here are, as mentioned, the background, collective intentionality and performatives. We have here a threefold analysis of the situation. The practice does have the same function on both sides. As the rules governed the structure that humans use in order to achieve certain goals, the performatives have little variation in the stylization capacity. The performatives as the monotonically used vehicle also have certain secondary functions, keeping the institution in question intact. People name the boat performatively, but also keep up the institution of naming boats in general, even though they mostly don't talk about it. So collective intentionality and some parts of the background are influenced by performatives. I pose the question: what makes the social world function, according to Searle's social ontology? The immediate answer is the performative that is, on the other hand, partly created by collective intentionality, the background or perhaps some other more complicated process.

Ferraris claims that collective intentionality can be replaced by the text (Ferraris 2013). He does not mention the background while suggesting this change to the basic notion of Searle's social ontology. The social in Searle's social ontology (Lawson, 2013) is a separate realm that is governed in terms of structural action. According to Lawson, "Generally speaking then, the *explananda* of the social realm, the phenomena to be explained are the practices in which people engage and the *explanans* are the physical, social and psychological conditions the relevant action (Lawson, 1997, 193). This leads us towards the background causation of Searle from the text, since the text is a less analytical category of the same phenomena and I am looking for analytical distinctions. According to Johansson, performing a successful speech act is related to a general theory of speech acts according to which speech acts rely on institutions and may fail when the speakers or listeners do not meet the right kind of position in the institution. When we are talking about the president's acts and their implications for the speech acts, however, as such assumes that the speech acts will be successful. When talking about speech acts and their effects, it is assumed that speech acts are felicitous. As an example of a speech act that an official authority does from the right kind of position but that fails, Johansson represents a situation where a declaration causes rioting and destruction (Johansson, 2008, 88). On the other hand, Searle writes that an ultimate system of status-functions can only operate if it is backed up by a monopoly of violence (Searle, 2008, 34).

Ferraris uses the concept of registration to refer to facts stored in the mind. From this perspective registrations are part of collective intentionality. On the other hand, Ferraris classifies documents in many categories. In my view these classifications help explain how registers, documents and codifications relate to performatives. These categories are only important according to the idea that the social world is flexible and non-real in that it consists of many factors that affect each other through representations. For example, the concept of money is represented by actual money, and the meaning attached to it is only one part of the problem. It is also a convention that is not connected to any inherent value. On the other hand, the leaves of a tree are special material components that can move energy from one place to another. This will be important later when I respond to the posthumanist discourses.

One question about bio citizenship is also about the idea of collective intentionality supporting it. It is needed to understand critical realist theory and limitations of collective intentionality and also discourse. Discourse and collective intentionality shape understanding of citizenship and in some sense (not necessarily theoretical meaning of term) recognition of citizenship in many senses. Especially discourse as terms shapes how we see reality through verbality and therefore gives hint of what is citizenship. This is contrasted to causality in general critical realism way in social ontology. I will come back to this later. Therefore, I think the concept itself needs a more precise formulation in many ways. The interpretation according to which Searle's concept of collective intentionality is problematic, could be applied to suit many different approaches to Searle's system of the causation in social ontology.

One point of view is that Searle seems to be opposed to individualism. That is a fact. The more important notion, however, is that he tries to save some aspects of individualism in the mechanisms and expectations of his system. Maybe Searle's project drops into the box that Hargreaves and Varoufakis (1995, 108) assign to the ventures outside the rational choice model by introducing conventions. They describe them as "half-disguised invitations to Wittgenstein, Kant or Hegel." This is only partly true, since Searle's ideas of collective intentionality and the background imply an entity in the social that is not individual. It is a convention. This is one of the basic particles of the practice approach.

Searle claims that the negation of collective acceptance does not need ongoing maintenance, opposed to conventional power, which typically requires constant maintenance in one way or another (Searle, 1995, 109). So the practice that enables the effects that need to be maintained is different from the practice that is in process. This is what Searle basically says in relation to the idea of the status function. If we think it through in a posthumanist sense, there is the situation where, for example, some service or possibility is privatized and a large number of people need to live without this service, etc. connected to their personal system of expectations. Does this not need maintenance even more than the old system that was stable? This is the Foucauldian idea that power constitutes power and there is no power-neutral point zero somewhere. Citizenship is one example.

This theory of causality is understood to be performative in Searle's framework. By the performative framework, I mean the basic idea of cause and effect between somebody uttering a sentence and the effect it causes. This process is at work, for example, in the declaration of war. It basically works in the following way: I say something that you recognize as the declaration of war (in large or small scale). The words establish the fact. Causality is more general term than performative (or discourse and collective intentionality as mentioned)

Another question, however, is, what is the status of causality, in itself as outside part of this process? This question can be answered by using Roy Bhaskar's (1979) idea of causal effects as potentials that work on the tendency principle, which means that tendency can be actualized as an actual force, etc.; however, it exists even in a potential form. The same is often true in human institutions. This idea is true, for example, of a word. There is the potential to make a declaration even if no one ever makes it. The important point here is that understanding the nature of conventions, (un)consciousness, etc. is crucial for understanding causality according to the performatives. Collier (1994) writes about critical realist understanding of unconsciousness. The idea of the unconscious, as mentioned earlier, is a common notion in the discussion about performatives. It is very much present, for example, in the famous Derrida-Searle debate.

There is the question that some words (or utterances) cause different kinds of effects. The notion of cause is not understood in any deeper way (scientific, conceptual, etc.); rather, it is understood only as a conventional relation between meaning and object (the effect). Causality is not important in itself (nor is it for one of my main points of reference, namely John R. Searle), but causality is understood as the successive performatives which in turn cause effects that are not tied to the performative causing these effects in any essential way. The level where the brute facts cause the effects is an emergent level of the social, according to Searle. If I say that a meeting is started and bang the table with a hammer and other conventions from then on are followed, it does not mean that the banging on the table would necessarily lead to such effects.

The plane of practice is therefore separate from any other level. So in this idea, Searle is not separate from the practice approach. He makes the separation by drawing his theory closer to the neo-materialist theory by admitting the material nature of the status function in his 1995 social ontology. I will look into the question of causality of the performatives through the ontology of Searle. It is important how the material background enables differences.

At the bottom the problems could be about Derrida's idea of the possibility of an illocution. An illocution means that the speech act is enforced and does surely succeed. On the other hand a perlocution is more random in its effects. The text cannot work causally if no difference exists between the perlocution and the illocution, because only the illocution has the billiard ball touch. To say it in another way, is it possible that causal patterns that are connected to social facts, or are they an impossible combination if social facts are understood to be socially constructed? The answer is, we learned from Bhaskar's account of causality (connected his practice approach to social sciences) that potential/tendency is the main source of a social sphere. So in Bhaskar's notion, nature is not separate from society in some sense in the same way as, for example, Latour.

This leads us to a posthumanist notion of everything as one. Then everything can re-contextualize, everything is on both a micro and a macro level, and therefore nothing would have any structure (meaning global theory here). There is an interpretation of the background (which is usually seen as the context C in status function) as the practice itself because the first is coded in the other.  $X=y$  in C. The background is seen as similar sized (theoretically) a part of the practice of collective intentionality as noted earlier. On the other hand, the background can always change. Therefore, this would lead to a certain amount of perlocution from every speech act because there are complex combinations of material and discursive elements *under* every social practice (which as earlier noted, can be in some sense reduced to the context in general).

The rules are very vague in the sense that the context is governed by practices that are not very explicit rules. Rules are again not functional in themselves but depend on collective intentionality that, on the other hand, depends on the background. This notion of the background is what makes the rules vague. This same idea is represented by the idea that the text is always beneath the practice (Ferraris 2013). There is a process of deeds that creates the practice. The practice is, according to Searle, basically rooted in conventional power. This is a very important addition to the ideas that concern the functioning of the social world. It makes sense to not split the idea of causality into two separate pieces like Searle's conception of causality in his social ontology, which splits into collective intentionality and the background. This is so Searle can do battle on two fronts. He can be a collectivist who tries to smuggle Wittgenstein and Kant into social sciences, at least to cover some areas instead of rational choice theory. On the other hand, he is developing an ontology that rejects many parts of the collective intentionality understood as the unconscious process that is a social fact—if social facts (as Searle says) are always embedded as part of the collective intentionality that is in part constituted by the background.

This is the weak spot in Searle's theory. Basically, the practices are connected to the power underneath those very same practices. According to Searle, destruction of a conventional power advances through collective acceptance not through the content of collective acceptance (Searle, 1995, 106). This makes it pure power, which is not connected to the large contents of the concept. This means basically that the rules and the background that keep the practice intact are not important in themselves; the acceptance comes from the fact that everybody repeats the same movements and same practices with the background knowledge that often understands that deeds are made to achieve certain outcomes.

On the other hand, all this is unimportant for the destruction of conventional power. When collective acceptance ends, it just ends the practice as a whole. That is the implication of Searle's theory. Here we must keep in mind the thesis of Ferraris that registrations are the basic building block of social reality. By registrations Ferraris means the same thing as Derrida with the text. Ferraris does explain the problems in Searle's theory of collective intentionality. In this view collective acceptance only changes the text to a different format. There is no entity without history, which is the text. In this sense the end of one acceptance makes the text different at one part but most likely does preserve some parts of the original text. The parts that govern the activities in this are partly overlapping. In the Latourian sense this history is more like an alliance between actors. The actors can be also nonhumans (Latour 2005), as Latour explains in his introduction to actor-network theory.

**Interlude on Standard Model in Social Ontology and On Anthropocentrism :** My focus is in intentionality and its role in social ontology. I will look at Brian Epstein's debate and his relation to John Searle's philosophy of mind. I will make space for constructive critique of Standard Model of Social Ontology, meaning standard way to see social ontology and therefore also philosophy of mind by Epstein who is less anthropocentric. Furthermore, I will look at the question and challenge posed to Epstein's critique of Standard Model. Epstein's view as I will argue is more like posthuman view where many elements like objects in network frame the way to give meanings to social phenomena instead of intentionality.

Epstein is a famous person in bringing more basic metaphysical debate to the social metaphysics of mind. There are questions about intentionality and non-human objects meaning all other objects connected to the network of intentionality. Epstein criticizes anthropocentric view of the social - Epstein calls for posthuman world view. Epstein argues in more general terms against Searle's idea that mental attitudes basically play role in construction of social reality. Mental attitudes are partly in terms of philosophy of mind, the origin of social in Searle's world view. There is an idea that laws that are similar with natural laws and they are a part of the process of social - as Searle calls social a process. In Epstein's view there is an idea that metaphysical ideas and tools from metaphysics are important for understanding the social and therefore also the mind.

Furthermore, I will look at Mattia Gallotti's view and on debate with Brian Epstein: there is a need for good theory of collective intentionality. Gallotti claims that understanding collective intentionality is a part of the understanding of nature and the structure of social facts. This is compatible claim partly with Searle or at least compatible with standard analytical social ontology. Gallotti however defends contents approach to collective intentionality in contrast to recognition approach of Searle. According to Gallotti there is a content or conditions that must obtain, attitudes and states of people to become shared. On the other side of this basic debate of collective intentionality there is the recognition as intersubjective force that makes the social attitude as collectivistic. Epstein is arguing for complete posthumanism in collective intentionality as network of mental attitudes. This is the basic assumption of that paper that there is posthuman network of human (also intentional)

actors and nonhuman actors just like Epstein describes in anchor and grounding conditions. Epstein sees the frame as the posthuman mesh of actors that frame the conditions to give meaning to some object normally described as and metaphysical tools to have greater clarity of collective intentionality. Epstein sees distributed cognition as basic frame principle that explains (instead of with intentionality how things get meaning in social in a posthuman way. That means cognition that comes from - or is in many places at the same time. Distributed cognition is a way to understand posthuman connection and human as augmented with. Emergence is grounding and anchoring theory together: according to me this could solve some problems in metaphysical discussion on some aspects of philosophy of mind.

### **Finally, Speech Acts and Bio Citizenship as Foucauldian Neorealist Premise**

Here I will define mostly the governmental question concerning the immigration. I will see Definition of risk and agency this might be a bit vague but should work. According to Ulrich Beck reflexive modernization means also as agency structure (theoretically structure, not structure as social structure) that individuation that "individuals reflect upon and flexibility the rules and resources of their workplace and leisure time" (Beck, 1992, 3) This analysis of risk agency is also present in changing mining laws of Finland my home country.

Biopower is a capacity to control ourselves with dispositive created in our social practices and their complex interaction. Reidar Due explains in his book *Deleuze*: "For all thought is now seen as social practice taking place within force field composed of other social practices" (Due, 2007, 127.) Those fields are Intuitively this idea seems to be reasonable. When it is looked down in more details there seems to be the problem that it is said that it is every thought that is composed of the force fields. Due claims that this notion is not causal because "thought is real, both as process and as a 'form of content' and that social reality cannot exist independently of the thoughts that it generates and that it embodies through social practices and modes of organization." (Due, 2007, 127-128.) This questions the Ferrarisian notion of separation between social and natural world. Before we can go to Anglo American reading of Biopower in Deleuze's thinking that founds this social ontology in paradoxical way let me briefly note some basic principles of Foucauldian theoretical project of biopower. I must start from the very beginning Foucault starts his famous book *The Archaeology of Knowledge*

"For many years now historians have preferred to turn their attention to long periods, as if beneath as if beneath the shifts and changes of political events, they were trying to reveal the stable almost indestructible system of checks and balances, the irreversible processes, the constant readjustments, the underlying tendencies that gather force, and are suddenly reversed after centuries of continuity, the movements of accumulation and slow saturation, the great silent, motionless bases that traditional history has covered with thick layer of events" (Foucault, 1972, 3)

On the other hand, it is important to note that from more scientific perspective the Foucauldian notion of biopower has been seen altogether as out of time by Donna Haraway. As Rosi Braidotti notes "Foucauldian diagrams of power describe what we have already ceased to be" (Braidotti, 1994, 104.) The important point here is that in posthumanist thinking (which Braidotti is part of) an important figure, Latour, states that "scientists define facts, only facts; they leave the politics and moralists the even more daunting task of defining values. Very important posthumanist thinkers such as Deleuze and Guattari (1983) in a word the socius as a full body forms a surface where all production is recorded, whereupon the entire process seems to emanate from this recording surface (Deleuze Guattari, 1983, 10) and" all production constituting a surface over which the forces and agents of production are distributed" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, 10) This shows how ways to speak go to same line with object oriented thinking described by tis creator as "object is whatever opposes the human subject"

Deleuze and Guattari state "The performative itself is explained by the illocutionary, not the opposite" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 87) Roland Bogue describes Deleuze's and Guattari's Thousand Plateaus in the following way: "*Thousand Plateaus* takes up many themes of the themes of *Anti-Oedipus* (volume one of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*), but in ways that do not so much complement as complicate the elaborate schemata of the first work. In place of the opposition of molar and molecular in *Anti-Oedipus*, one finds a triad of molar, molecular and nomadic, to which correspond three 'lines': the molar or hard segmentary line, the molecular or supple segmentation line, [and] the line of flight. (Bogue, 1989, 124) John Searle writes that institutions are historic and created by language. (Searle, 2010) This makes it easier to understand differences of neomaterialism to linguistic understanding of institutions. In neoliberalism it is general there is no public institution that would deliver the service but a filter mechanism for example phone calls at standard (cheap) price. Then institution in sense of the risk understanding and management technologies is only filter that helps to understand risks. This leads to

neomaterialism that does not make difference between material and language or society and nature. The comparison is important in order to shed light on the fact that interconnections reduce risks in Ulrich Beck's theory about risks in society and when nature and society or language and material are interconnected, then it is easier to see and trace the interconnections that reduce risks. Goodchild describes Deleuze's idea of institution as: "All fixed orders of society, including conventions institutions and impulses that provide a framework for possible social relations but which themselves remain unaffected by what happens are instances of antiproduction" (Goodchild,1996 ,74) In Deleuzian terms institution seems to be this kind of filter mechanism that is not static institution. One example of practice approach and how it is connected to the registers is how capital plays the role of a recording surface. (Deleuze & Quattari, 1983, 11-13.)

Ferraris's idea that the collective intentionality is better explained through arch writing, the text as the contents (Ferraris, 2013, 154) According to Andrew Sayer, critical realist with posthuman twist in his theories: "If structures are widely distributed such as those of capital accumulation, then this implies that although they have some spatial and temporal precondition these can be met in variety of spatial and temporal contexts" (Sayer, 2000, 136-137) There is institution of capital accumulation that is not fixed and as Sayer states affects spatial and temporal contexts that are not part of the institution. Finnish Teivo Teivainen uses plane as word that can explain some breaking of barriers in theoretical methodology framework - that resembles general ontology in partly Marxist and non- Marxist economical debates. The same idea can be found in the way Deleuze describes the concept of **diagram** "Panopticon traverses all these forms and is applied to all these substances: it is in this sense that a category of power exists, as a pure disciplinary function. Foucault will therefore name this this the *diagram*, a function that must be 'detached from any specific use' as from any specific substance" (Deleuze, 1988, 72)

This questions the Ferrarisan notion of separation between social and natural world could be also seen as Foucauldian according to Ferraris (2013) who sees his social ontology as Foucauldian also. On the other hand, it is important to note that from more the Foucauldian notion of biopower has been seen altogether as governmentality in some popular discourse of Foucaultian theory. As Pennywise title remembering out of time by Donna Haraway meaning that Haraway sees Foucault as out of time in the 1980's boom and enthusiasm on new technologies. As Rosi Braidotti notes Foucauldian diagrams of power describe history of different pressures in society and such. (Braidotti, 1994, 104.) Foucault is very important for some forms of most contemporary Britt Marxism. There is Marxist pressures and chaotic piles of history (in Marxist sense) so to write.

To not to word posthumanism thinkers such as Deleuze and Guattari in the concept/term the *socius* as a full body forms a surface where all production is recorded, whereupon the entire process seems to emanate from this recording surface (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, 10) and "all production constituting a surface over which the forces and agents of production are distributed" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, 10) This shows how ways to speak go to same line with object oriented thinking described by tis creator as "object is whatever opposes the human subject"

"The quasi causality of the body without organs is best understood in relation to the larger social body without organs, which, in its reterritorialized form, Deleuze and Guattari call *socius*" (Bogue, 1989, 94) How could these areas created be the sole purpose and driving force of calculation? If object-oriented ontology is understood also partly through the structuring of objects as things in themselves, then it could and maybe should be seen that these calculations are only part of the complex process of calculating and changing different elements. Deleuze and Guattari state "The performative itself is explained by the illocutionary, not the opposite" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 87) Roland Bogue describes Deleuze's and Guattari's Thousand Plateaus in the following way: "*Thousand Plateaus* takes up many themes of the themes of *Anti-Oedipus* (volume one of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*), but in ways that do not so much complement as complicate the elaborate schemata of the first work. In place of the opposition of molar and molecular in *Anti-Oedipus*, one finds a triad of molar, molecular and nomadic, to which correspond three 'lines': the molar or hard segmentary line, the molecular or supple segmentation line, [and] the line of flight. (Bogue, 1989, 124) These lines are not important itself for my research except that they make it easier to see what is the role of the performative in the mechanistic collective. Foucault states that: "For a long time it was thought that language had mastery over time, that it acted both as future bond of promise and as memory and narrative " (Foucault, 1994, 167) "All fixed orders of society, including conventions institutions and impulses that provide a framework for possible social relations but which themselves remain unaffected by what happens are instances of antiproduction" (Goodchild,1996 ,74)



In this chapter it is important to see that according to my theoretical understanding New Realism is not a Realist position in general (namely that reality has its own existence independent of the subject) but it is more like an development of post-modernist thought, an attempt to fix different kinds of problematic associated with post-modernist assumptions there has developed different forms of realism. It is important to note that Graham Harman describes that de Landa has drawn a distinction among different linear causation which is normally material and catalysis causation which is usually expressive. These can be understood also as modes of reality social or natural in a sense that expressive is social and not material.

This is important because Harman claims that the idea that entities are only catalysts is similar to Bhaskar's idea that there are always many tendencies in every cause. (Harman, 195-196, 2010) The new realist divides to nature and society compared to other forms of realism that are near to it theoretically. To note One example of practice approach and how it is connected to the registers is how capital plays the role of a recording surface. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, 11-13.) The capital can also be seen as metaphor in a Bourdieu way. John W. Cook argues that Wittgenstein Humean view of Causation did not change during his philosophical career. (Cook, 1994, 177-181.) This understanding of causes is common to the Wittgensteinian theory of knowledge. Human practises constitute the meaning and knowledge in the social world. Ian Hacking writes in his book: *Social Construction of What that* "Kant may have cast the mold, but drive for construction belongs to the twentieth century" (Hacking, 1999, 47.) The assumption that constructivist account belongs to twentieth century is supported by Scott Lash. He tries to challenge the assumption that critical theory is modernist and post-structuralism is post-modernist (Lash, 1990, 153.) This can be understood as risk more important than culture and era before first world war coming back can be traced back to this pragmatism. The idea in neocommunist terms (basically neocommunist as one story in neocommunist) is that conformism and consumerism swallowed the socialist creative ways to more uniform counter or subculture.

Risk can be traced and blocked in counterculture is the common intuition nowadays. Next I will posit these questions about ontological being (in general) in the framework of social ontology. Namely in the world of conventions rules and performatives. According to Deleuze applies this genetic principle to all features of social organization including the human 'subject' (Due, 2007, 130.) The formal starting point of their method is multiplicity. A multiplicity is an indeterminate 'group' defined formally as *a capacity to be affected* prior to the elements that it will consist of" (Due, 2007, 130.) Latour sees the social or as he likes to put it assemblages as entities that are interconnected and intertwined. Also, counterculture can be seen in Latourian way. Counterculture is an example of assemblage and risk here. The point is about separation of nature and society.

Elder-Vassess account of causality separates different Spheres of Social Reality. From point of view of this Latour/Deleuze axis he claims that social is part of the well structured and organized, layered theory, of emergence of properties *from nature* since he is claiming that collective intentionality can be individuated as a certain strata of reality that is either needed or not needed in the causal sphere. The claim that the social world and social structures are represented by text denies this claim because the social is therefore always represented by text. Ferraris is suggesting that collective intentionality is replaced by texts. A textual/social form can be easily altered by the individual. Causality of human action is often modified in practice as R. Harre and E.H Madden (1975, 83.) claim in their book *Causal Powers*. Critical realists take a very different approach towards reality and claim that reality consists of different levels and those levels function as independent unredusable through the concept of emergence. Searle does also state that emergence plays an important function in the explanative structure of nature.

In other words, reality is constructed as a theoretical model where entities are placed in different stratas of social, or natural reality. This point can be further represented by Alf Hornborg who claims that Latour does not see phenomena such as imperialism embedded in technology because he is in fact so obsessed with how we use objects that he does not see how the object use us. (Hornborg, Reidar Due explains in his book *Deleuze* "For all thought is now seen as social practise taking place within force field composed of other social practises" (Due, 2007, 127.) The force consists of objects and persons that both have a similar agency.

One example of practise approach and how it is connected to the registers is how capital plays the role of a recording surface. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, 11-13.) Ferraris's idea that the collective intentionality is better explained through archwriting, the text as the contents (Ferraris, 2013, 154). Ferraris helps in this project by opening a door for more sophisticated understanding of the terms that Searle calls the causal explanation in his theory. The three terms Searle uses for causal explanation in his social ontology must be reformed in more

Marxist, self reflexive and critical theoretical sense. I claim I will combine the best parts of these ontologies described by Renault by using Searle's ontology as the basis of my research and constructing a process-oriented ontology to three terms that explain causation in Searle's ontology.