

Rise of Non- Western Powers and Challenges to the Liberal Democratic Agenda in the Global Politics

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ABSTRACT: The present paper analyses the impact of the emergence of non-western powers on the liberal democratic agenda in the global politics. By the term non - western powers, the study intends to portray countries like Russia, China and emerging democracies such as India, South Africa and Brazil. The policies and programme of democracy promotion, often promoted by democratic states like USA, is considered as the major element of liberal democratic agenda as mentioned in the study.

KEY WORDS: Non- Western Powers, Liberal Democracy, Democracy Promotion, United States.....

I. INTRODUCTION

The end of cold war in the 1990s had heralded the advent of a new era. Predictions had been emerged about the nature of the new world order. End of History analysis and Clashes of Civilizations propositions stood at the forefront of these theories. Many had predicted the subsistence of a unipolar world headed by the United States and facilitated by the absence of a key potential ideological opponent. The major developments in the first decade of the post- cold war period substantiated this claim. However, certain global political developments emerged with the dawn of new millennium apparently questioned such a perception of the unilateral dominance of United States. There have been notable developments that could make some sorts of impacts in the pattern of global power distribution. These developments are interrelated and they have affected liberal democracy, liberal democratic states and democracy promotion directly and indirectly. These developments, as identified, include emergence of non- western powers, the failed intervention in Islamic world, crisis in the global economy, the crisis of EU, China's rise and new background of democracy in Asia, impacts of Arab Spring, declining image of United States, and declining liberal democratic countries.

Among these events, the rise of Non- western countries including both democratic powers and authoritarian powers like China is a crucial aspect that affected the global power dynamics particularly the democratic prospects of the world. The following section deals with this aspect in detail.

Rise and Growth of Non- Western Democratic Powers: One of the striking features of the post-2000 world order was the rise and empowerment of non-western countries. This has been pointed out by many scholars. According to Kristensen (2015) “emerging powers like China, India and Brazil are receiving growing attention as objects in International Relations (IR) discourse” (p. 637). Another observation says that “the rise of regional powers has attracted growing international attention” (Wagner and Faust, 2010, p.1). This group was composed of both democratic and authoritarian countries. These countries were capable enough of influencing many significant global matters. This new phenomenon was observed with anxiety and hope alike by the existing powers like the US. Stuenkel, (2016) says that “ it is the fact that we are witnessing a shift of power away from the West and towards so-called “emerging powers” such as China and India raise the important question of the ways in which democracy promotion – and democracy itself – will be affected by this trend” (para.1) .

They perceive that the emergence of autocratic states like China and Russia might pose economic, military, political and ideological threat to western countries that rest on the liberal democratic model. The economic rise of these countries was rapid and consistent. They have imperialistic ambitions since the very beginning. The new global environment enabled them to expand their footholds to every corner of the world. China's economic and physical aid to various Asian and African countries challenges the prevailing predominance of United States. They consistently act against the decisions of west in various international forums. For example, China and Russia had always protected Sri Lanka from the harsh actions of UNHRC. Leaders of various developing and underdeveloped countries preferred their model to settle internal issues by side-lining the western advices. The reason is that these models were more attractive to them as these authoritarian countries including China have achieved consistent advancement despite having similar internal problems. The manner they evade allegations of suppressing democratic freedom and confronting domestic uprisings has always inspired other small troubled states. So, there was high chance to imitate the authoritarian models against democratic. On the other hand, the

realization that there have been considerable numbers of democratic countries, though not purely liberal democracies, among the newly emerging powers has prompted the US and its allies to seek possibilities for new partnerships. The democratic countries among rising powers are understood as the group of emerging-market democracies (EMDs) including the developing countries that possess democratic governments at the internal sphere and also occupies central place in the global economy. Owing to their mounting economic and political power in the international arena, the foreign policies of these countries, and particularly the importance that they earmark to assist democracy and human rights abroad, warrant larger attention and analysis (Brookings, 2011, p.9).

The United States by the time is not in a position to champion all its missions as it did in the past. Its declining power has affected the ability to uphold projects like democracy promotion as earlier. This reality led to some new analyses. According to one observation “ In the 21st century, the democracy and human rights agenda will depend on whether emerging-market democracies see value in a world composed of states with similar political systems in which human rights are respected, the rule of law is consolidated and enforced, and governance is non-transparent and accountable (Brookings, 2011, p.10). In such a context the cooperation and collaboration of non-western democracies become crucial for the survival of many of the tagline projects. Youngs et.al, (2016) says that “it is commonly asserted that Western liberal democracy is losing credibility and that the international community must be more open to tolerating, and even encouraging, non- Western political models in developing and rising powers” (para.1). As a result there have been growing demands for non-western forms of democracy for the last many years and now such calls are becoming louder and more rampant.

For long, there was a belief that democracy promotion would be efficient and viable only when it is led by western liberal democracies. However, this assumption began to wane away with the emergence of non-western democracies. Identifying this, the leaders of democracy promotion did not hesitate to invite the non-western democracies into the gang of democracy promoters. As a first step they admitted that though democracy is the most preferable model for the world, the western liberal democracy is not the sole model of democratic rule. This denotes that there are other varieties of democracy too, probably in the non-western part. Youngs (2015b, para.10) has pointed out certain statements of then global leaders to signify the professed willingness of west to accommodate non-western democracies also. The remark of United Nations GA in 2007 that there is no single model of democracy, though democracies possess certain shared characteristics and the assurance of then US SoS, Hilary Clinton in 2011 in the wake of Arab Spring, that each society can endeavor to achieve its own democratic values and shape suitable democratic institutions according to own comfort as we also recognise the distinctiveness of culture and history and experience, can be pointed out as instances. Following the statement of Hilary Clinton President Barack Obama also stated that it cannot be insisted that all countries need to pursue a model of representative as practiced and upheld by United States. From the side of EU its foreign-policy chief Catherine Ashton declared that “although democracy is the basis of the European Union, it can be said undoubtedly that there is no solo model for democratic government.

There are some reasons for the growing demand for the non-western democracies’ participation in democracy promotion. According to Youngs (2015b) one of the reasons is the poor performance of western democracy itself. Secondly the non-western democracies are now emerging without any hindrances and it is very visible too. There is a possibility of utilising the capacity and experiences of them to effectively promote democracy and other western values into other transitional countries that are alien to liberal democratic cultures but more or less similar to the characteristics of non-western democracies like India. There is a widely held perception at the global level that the democratic success of India was a unique event in the history of democratisation because it lacked many of the preconditions, including various socio-economic and political factors, believe to be needed for a long enduring democratic government. Moreover, the US held a view that given the historical animosity of India towards China, the former would be counter weights to the latter both ideologically and physically. Moreover, there is a possibility of grand democratic alliance in many of the critical geographical regions like Indian Ocean Region and Pacific Region if other actors like Japan and Australia join with India under the leadership of United States of America. At the same time, it is crucial to discuss how these democracies have responded to the international call for their involvement in the global projects and how they have acted. It is widely observed that the emerging democracies were traditionally reluctant to be part of democracy promotion. By pointing out this, Carothers and Youngs (2011a, para, 2) say that “rising democracies, however, are often reluctant to publicly embrace a democracy and human rights agenda. Most of them are exponents of the pro-sovereignty, anti-interventionist approach to international politics”. They are suspicious about the real intention behind it. Kurlantzick (2012, para. 11) says that “but 15 years into the effort to make democracy promotion a global goal shared by these and other emerging powers, the results are becoming clearer, and they aren’t encouraging”.

They are also fearful that active engagement in democracy promotion and allied activities might drag own domestic issues and faults into public space and it may lead to the further worsening of such problems. Most of the newly emerging democracies face various kinds of problems including secessionism, majoritarianism, poverty, inequality, populism, ultra-nationalism and declining quality of democracy. As a result, for decades, these countries including India had strictly adhered to the principles of national sovereignty, and anti-interventionism. Most of the emerging powers are regional powers for many decades. They have regional aspirations as well as challenges. Their economy, to some extent, depends on the regional markets than the global. In many cases these countries, including India, face border related problems. Their borders are porous and prone to encroachment and infiltration. Cross border terrorism has been a worrying factor for many decades in many regions. Hence, since the very beginning these countries realised that a cordial, focused and enhanced relations with immediate neighbours and similar friends would be more urgent than alliance with global actors for the sake of promoting democracy and other contentious affairs. As a result, they became more attentive to developing friendly relations with other governments and enhancing South-South cooperation. They are careful about avoiding the subversion of significant financial and strategic ties by raising delicate and contentious human rights and democracy issues. They are besieged with their own domestic development challenges and are not interested to pool their limited resources for the sake of democracy support.

The hypocrisy of western powers too has become a talk among non-western democracies. The non-western emerging democratic powers for decades held a view that the popularly disseminated international liberal norms are tools that aid the great powers to promote their influence and interests. The hypocritical nature of the democracy promoters has been pointed by many. As Borzel (2015, p.523) says “the EU and the US made democracy promotion an explicit goal of their foreign policy. Yet, they also pursue other goals, such as political stability, economic growth, energy supply, or security”. They are suspected, to be interested, in promoting democracy only when it augments their strategic and economic interests and whenever their attempts to promote democracy create clash with other material interests, the western countries prioritize the latter to the former. The United States has not hesitated to accept the illegitimate post-coup leaders in Venezuela (2002), Honduras (2009), and Egypt (2013), and has vigorously backed oppressive governments in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. This realisation forces the non-western actors to see the western powers as hypocrites (Carothers and Youngs, 2011). At the same time, one thing is clear that these emerging powers are not in a position to out rightly negate the growing appeal to their involvement in democracy related activities. The first cause is that the many non-western democracies see that there is a need for aligning with United States. The internal dichotomy and contestations among the emerging powers especially for capturing markets and disputed borders forced emerging democracies like India to seek the support of global powers headed by US. Along with this, after a series of pro-market domestic economic reforms they were waiting for a proper entry into global economy championed by western liberal democracies. Hence, they saw the collaboration in global projects like democracy promotion, which were traditionally dominated by United States, as an opportunity to move more towards the global players. The major favourable shift in India’s foreign policy approach in the early 2000s can be treated as a best example. However, even while doing so, they did not abandon their traditional reluctance and suspicion. Considering this aspect, Youngs (2019, p.5) opined that though many non-western powers are democratic, and these countries are taking at least some endeavours to assist democracy outside their borders, it is a relevant thing not to exaggerate the scale or efficacy of these energies, because they are definitely no more than erratic, limited, and warmish.

Non-western Democratic Powers and Democracy Promotion: The activities of non- western democracies include multiple strategies. They contribute to the empowerment of democracy and governance standards in the regional organizations to which they belong to. They attempt to settle regional disputes and confrontations by the means of pro-democratic mediation. Assistance to successful conduct of election in neighbouring countries is given by sharing election knowhow. Apart from individual efforts, they try to do collective works to transfer and consolidate experiences and other assets pertaining to democracy. The Bali Democracy Forum and some other joint initiatives of countries like India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea are aimed to strengthen democracy in the Asian region (Carothers and Youngs, 2011). On the side of the Pacific Ocean, these Asian countries have begun promoting democracy more actively. Indonesia pressurised the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to include provisions for democracy assistance and obligation to defend democratic norms into the group’s 2008 Charter along with its diplomatic endeavours to introduce political reforms in East Asian countries like Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam (Youngs, 2019 p. 5). India assisted the return to normalcy of conflict-ridden South Asian countries of Nepal, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan. The most visible attempts to reconstruct democracy by India is going on in Afghanistan. India had played a role in the settlement of Maoist violence in Nepal and in the subsequent attempts to draft a democratic constitution in the country. The only attempt to address the problem of power devolution in Sri Lanka, the 13th amendment to its constitution with some sorts of

measures of sharing power, was the contribution of India. Even in the post- LTTE era, the talk on some kinds of actions for further democratisation is centred on India's erstwhile contributions and its domestic models of federalism. Countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Chile make some pertinent responses to the democratic decline and other related issues in their respective region. They have played critical role in various countries like Haiti, Honduras and Paraguay. Brazil assisted the political and economic reconstruction of Haiti. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile responded powerfully to a 2009 military coup in Honduras and to a rather unique sort of coup against Paraguay's sitting President in 2012. Influencing regional organisations is one of the major areas of their work. With a view to protect ruling governments from sudden undemocratic coups, they exerted pressure on different Latin American regional bodies such as Mercosur and the Organization of American States to incorporate stringent democracy protection clauses (Stuenkel, 2013a). As a result, the Organization of American States has added an Inter-American Democracy Charter, and most other Latin American organizations have democracy clauses in their by- laws.

There are some commonalities between western and non-western democracy support. First of all, it can be seen that there is no significant distinction in terms of quality of the nature of democracy aid between the western promoters and non- western promoters. Both work and fund for similar activities including democracy-related training and capacity-building projects, election management, decentralization, security sector reforms, anticorruption measures, and inclusive peace settlements. While Countries like India, Brazil and Indonesia engage in such activities, Japan concentrate on governance assistance to state institutions which is a favourite area of EU also. Similarly, South Africa's attempts to introduce security sector reforms in conflict states and vulnerable political atmosphere resembles the attempts of many western governments (Carothers and Youngs, 2011a; Ichihara, 2013; Stuenkel, 2013a). It has been a widely held view that the non-western democracies are reluctant to engage in democracy promotion activities in an open manner and hence they are different from western countries that are overtly doing the same. However, it can't be overlooked that nowadays western countries are also careful avoiding more aggressive and open actions in the name of democracy promotion.

Both the western and non-western democracies have supported and befriended with authoritarian regimes in spite of their professed commitment to democracy and its deepening. As another point of similarity, the internal democracy is declining in both western parts and non-western countries. Democracy is back sliding in these countries. Rise of populism, ultra-nationalism, corruption, internal tussle in political parties etc. have affected the quality of democracy. The 2018 Varieties of Democracy Index highlighted that Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey are at the forefront of the world's key democratic backsliders (Varieties of Democracy, 2018). Leaders like Turkey's Eurdogan, Brazil's new President Jair Bolsonaro have shown clear authoritarian tendencies from the side of Non-Western democracies. They praise military domination and religious clergy. Turkey along with personalist domination is trying to be the patron of Islamic world. The major democratic party, African National Congress, in South Africa is suffering from internal factionalism. Similar tendencies are visible in India, and Indonesia (Bergmann et.al, 2018).

At the same time the democracy is facing similar crisis in the western countries too. Study reports of different agencies lament this. Freedom House's 2018 report highlight the disturbing condition of democracy in different European countries (Freedom House, 2018). According to the findings of the Economist Intelligence Unit's 2018 Democracy Index, from 2006 onwards Western Europe and Eastern Europe have been facing the problem of decreasing quality of democracy in all parts significantly (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019). The index described the United States as a flawed one instead of a perfect democracy. However even though these countries are transformed as illiberal in certain aspects of their behaviour, they are not out rightly negating the possibilities of democracy promotion in their foreign relations. They have continued to render support through various institutions, funding projects, sharing expertise and technical know-how. The distinction in targeted recipients of aids can be seen as a small departure from the western model of democracy assistance and non-western model of assistance. The non- western democracies focus mainly on providing straight aid to neighbouring countries, while western promoters attempt to make a global reach (Youngs, 2019) Even while there are many similarities in approaches, and apparent willingness to accommodate each other, the tendencies to cooperate for a coordinated work is absent in both the groups. Regarding this, Youngs (2019) says that " both sides appear to have lost interest in finding ways to cooperate more systematically on democracy support. In the early 2000s such attempts were visible. Community of Democracies and Democracy Caucus were formed as part of this. However, nowadays this interest has been eroded" (para. 53). It is a reality of the current juncture that the western countries cannot achieve much progress in any of the global matters without the cooperation of non-democratic countries. However, both the western liberal democracies and the non-western market democracies find the formation of a concrete platform for cooperation as risky. In the words of Miller and Sokolsky (2020),

“in theory, it would be possible to form a coalition of democracies for promoting freedom in the global sphere and to find collaborative remedies to some of the most challenging global and regional puzzles which means crafting an innovative and iconic novel alliance of democracies would be cow in the text” (para. 3). But in practice it would be very difficult to achieve the desired aim of crafting such an alliance. As a concluding remark, it can be observed that the ultimate attainment of interests of United States and its like-minded allies would be depending on their ability to sort out strategies to produce constructive engagements of other rising powers like China and Russia despite the fact they are undemocratic countries and they do not value human rights or any other principles of democracy.

China: The Major Impediment to Liberal Democracy : The rise of China along with other emerging powers was one of major notable developments in the 21st century. The admission of China into the WTO in 2003 marked a major turn in the evolution of the country into the global domain. This march of China in the global sphere continues even in the second decade of the new millennium without significant hurdles. Today, with about \$14 trillion economy and most powerful military systems, it retains the second position among global powers. The rise of China poses two kinds of threats to the aspirations of democracy. The Chinese model of governance is unique. China was founded and developed on the basis of communist model of politics and economy. In the post-Mao era, the state made a transition into market economy while retaining the communist oppressive features in the political sphere. This combination is widely seen as the reason for the stable and ever-increasing power status of the country.

The exponents of democracy promotion fear that this model of consolidated and expansive system would appear as the most attractive and preferable model, by outdoing the liberal democratic designs, for many states who are either undergoing transitions or aspiring to transform their system. They may emulate the Chinese model especially when the China too tries to reach out to such countries with its enormous economic and technical aid programs. This is the first factor of fear emanates from the rise of new states. On the other hand, given the nature of domestic rule of China, millions of ordinary people are forcefully denied the opportunities to live under, and enjoy the fruits of the democratic model of governance. It is aptly observed that “the increasingly prosperous, mighty, and assertive China is arguably the most powerful country blocking democracy today. In addition to withholding democratic rights of one-fifth of the world’s population, authoritarian China represents an alternative development model that has gained significant traction. China thus constitutes a challenge to democracy promoters” (Chen & Kinzelbach, 2015, p.400). While considering the estimates of the Chinese population this fear is not silly. The Chinese population is around 1.35 billion and constitute approximately 20 percent of world population. At the same time the presence of China has produced two kinds of positive reflections in the state of democracy in the Asian region. First of all, the China factor has not merely prompted others to emulate its model and rather there have been attempts to resist by utilising the possibilities of democracies. Asian continent has witnessed for several democratic uprisings in the present decade. Strong democratic resistance and attempts to democratic opening can be seen in the forefront of Asian region. The resistance to China inspired by democratic ambitions broke out in Taiwan and Hong Kong was known as Umbrella Movement and Sun Flower Movement respectively. This was against the long- maintained fear in the western quarters that the presence and successful consolidation of China may drive others in the region to imitate it rather than to resist it.

India, Japan and Indonesia have, since the very inception of talks, been included in the spectrum of the potential Asian countries to uphold democracy. Undoubtedly, they have tried to touch the aspects of democracy in the region. They have undertaken several staunch individual efforts to promote democracy in their respective region in addition to their constant adherence to democratic rule in their domestic system. India intervened and engaged with several states in transition in South Asia like Afghanistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Similarly, Japan is engaging in a dedicated effort to assist democratic changes in Myanmar. They perceived the threat of a potential Chinese encroachment into these states unless there is an enhanced and timely engagement from other side. Apart from individual efforts, they have been expressing willingness to cooperate with each other in an enhanced and unprecedented way. Schoff (2020) states that “Japan is gradually hedging its heavy reliance on the US–Japan relationship. It signed on to new security and economic cooperation agreements with countries including Australia, India, Canada and the Philippines, as well as collective agreements with NATO and the European Union. Japan is also investing in international organisations such as ASEAN, the Asian Development Bank and APEC” (para.5). There has been India -Japan joint declarations in 2008, 2013 and 2015 and 2017. The first Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX) held in 2012. Japan also joined the U.S.- India joint Malabar Naval Exercises in 2015 as a permanent member. Japan’s attempts to build democratic alliances manifested in different ways. In 2012, the Asian Security

Diamond Concept was propagated by Japan. Japan entered into the quadrilateral alliance comprising other democratic powers of Australia, India, and the United States. In 2015, Japan initiated the two-plus-two dialogues with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence of Indonesia. It crafted certain important agreements with democratic states including the agreement on the Protection of Classified Military Information with South Korea in 2016, agreement on the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology with Philippines in 2016, and an agreement to enhance its maritime security ties with Indonesia in 2017 (Ichihara, 2017). Similarly, India also came forward for furnishing certain notable security tie-ups comprising democratic countries. As part of this, India reached to Indonesia in 2017 with its first joint air combat exercise and the crafting of a mutual agreement to extended maritime security cooperation. Aiming the production of military vessels, India reached out to South Korea by furnishing a memorandum of understanding. Indonesia, prompted partially by the expanding presence of China in the surrounding maritime region, developed a Global Maritime Fulcrum Vision in 2014 (Ichihara, 2017). In one sense, it can be said that the individual attempts have been outweighed by collective and cooperative efforts to contain China by using the possibilities of democracy. China's excessive claims and coercive behaviour in the South and East China Sea, its bullying behaviour against Australia and its smothering of political dissent in Hong Kong continue to push Japan into an 'all of the above' approach. This approach embraces multiple regions around the world to expand partnerships and blunt Chinese diplomatic advances, while still promoting a stable and productive relationship with China (Schoff, 2020, pp.1-2).

The rise of China has directly challenged the United States. The latter is, to a great extent, is confused of how to contain the former. In the initial years of the new millennium, Washington tried to accommodate Beijing into the global framework. It is evident that the inclusion and the subsequent rising prominence of China in various platforms including multilateral forums has not become a boon to the liberal framework of the current order. It was inducted into international organisations like WTO and Human Rights Council. However, the United States failed to influence China's behaviour. Baer (2020) says that "it's easy to identify areas where this has not delivered the desired results: China is a member of the Human Rights Council despite, inter alia, its imprisonment of over a million Uighurs in concentration camps; the WTO fails to sufficiently curb China's unfair trading practices; the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea has not stopped China's creeping expansion in the South China Sea" (para.4). According to experts the US, by its own power, is incapable of containing the march of China in many spheres. The possibilities of enhanced cooperation with non- western countries are to be sought in such a condition. Burns (2020), talks about this reality. According to him "preventing China's rise is beyond America's capacity, and our economies are too entangled to decouple" (para. 39).

Schoff (2020, p.2) identifies that it may be the erosion of US political power that is encouraging the Chinese diplomats and military leaders to take more aggressive actions in shielding own core interests. According to him "the United States alone will be increasingly less inclined or able to stymie Chinese gains in Asia, and if Beijing can deter other Asian countries from acting together, then its dominance in the region is virtually assured" (para.10). So, the choices of non-western democracies are very crucial in determining the picture. The EU is also facing a similar challenge from China. The EU has now begun to perceive China as systemic competitor that necessitates an enhanced preparation to compete with. This firm view on China has been clearly expressed in a January 2019 policy paper on EU-China economic relations from the powerful Federation of German Industries (BDI) (Brattberg and Corre, 2020). The preparatory works for a hardened and realistic approach toward China has started during the past three years with revived attempts for effective coordination and defence over economic issues, including FDI, state-aid and technology transfers. Corre (2020) says that " Not only did the European Commission create a new FDI screening mechanism, to be operational in October, but it has also issued guidelines on 5G technology and a white paper on foreign subsidies. In addition, it launched a connectivity strategy with the hope of offering a European alternative to China's "Belt and Road Initiative" (para. 6). In this way, the EU is facing challenges from the machinations of Russia and China. "The latter is bad news if the EU is to deal with the ineluctable insidious rise of China and Russia's constant meddling in Europe's democratic institutions", Dempsey (2019, para.4) says. It has been undoubtedly said, after analyzing the impacts of the rising China and other similar authoritarian states, that the champions of liberal democracy promotion have been facing a serious challenge with regards to the same.

II. CONCLUSION

Agenda in global politics has always been determined by the powerful nation States. When such nation- states function according to their strength, naturally their ideological aspects also become dominant in the global scenario. The post cold war era had witnessed for different kinds of power shifts. Such shifts have gradually derailed the unilateral and unipolar presence of United States that had been more visible in the first decade of post- cold war era.

The rise of Non- western countries was the major reasons for such a change. Russia, China and emerging democracies like India stood at the forefront of this bloc. The rapid regaining of the legacy of Soviet Union by Russia and stunning economic growth of China fuelled this phenomenon. These countries have posed challenges not only to the global strength of states like United States, but also to the ideology they possess that is liberal democracy. While Russia and China put forward authoritarian alternative , non western democratic countries like India places non- neo liberal democratic models.

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